28-33 U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY

33-38 USS ARIZONA & USS PRESTON

38-41 AMERICAN EMBASSY TOKYO JAPAN

41 NAVAL HQTRS PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

42-43 STAFF COMMANDER ALLIED FORCES, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

43-44 OFFICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVY DEPT WASH D.C.

44-45 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT PEARL HARBOR.

45 HQTRS. U.S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC. FIRST CONTINGENT U.S. FORCES TO ENTER TOKYO

45-46 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASH. D.C.

46 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

47 ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE NORFOLK VA.

47-48 COMMANDING OFFICER USS NOA (DD-841)

48-51 OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

51-53 OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

55 OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

55-56 STAFF COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST

56-59 STAFF COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

59-63 OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

63-66 DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

66- DEPUTY DIRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 OCTOBER 1966 - DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

B I O G R A P H I C S K E T C H

VICE ADMIRAL RUFUS L. TAYLOR, U. S. NAVY

Rufus Lackland Taylor was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on January 6, 1910, son of Mrs. Caroline Newman Taylor and the late Rufus L. Taylor. He attended Soldan High School in St. Louis, Missouri, Holderness School in Plymouth, New Hampshire, and Hall's School, Columbia, Missouri, before entering the U. S. Naval Academy, August 25, 1929. He was graduated on June 1, 1933. He attained the rank of Vice Admiral on June 1, 1966.

After graduation he was attached to the Sixth Naval Reserve Area at St. Louis and later served aboard the USS ARIZONA and the USS PRESTON (DD-379).

From September 1938 to September 1941, he was a student of the Japanese language at the American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan. He was then posted to the Sixteenth Naval District Headquarters at Cavite, Philippine Islands, for duty as a Communications Officer. After the United States troops at Bataan had surrendered to the Japanese, he was sent to Australia, and from April 1942 February 1943 served on the Staff of the Commander Allied Naval Forces, Southwestern Pacific.

Returning to the United States, he served from March 1943 to November 1944 in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. Again ordered to the Pacific in December 1944, he served throughout the remaining period of the War at Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, Pearl Harbor.

He was attached to the General Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific, in August 1945, and was included in the first contingent of U. S. Forces to enter Japan after the capitulation of the Japanese. He remained in Japan with the Occupation Forces from August to November 1945.

He returned to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in November 1945, where he served until June 1946. He was then assigned to the Central Intelligence Group until transferred as a student to the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia, in February 1947. He commanded the USS NOA (DD-841), from June 1947 to April 1948. In May of that year he was transferred to duty in the Office of Naval Intelligence, where he remained until November 1951, when he became Assistant Head of the Security Branch, Communications Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Administration).

In May 1953 he was assigned to the National Security Agency Directorate, Washington, D. C., and in December of the same year was transferred to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On March 17, 1955 he was ordered to duty on the Staff of Commander Naval Forces, Far East, as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and a year later was transferred to the Staff of Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, again as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

From 1959 to 1963 he served in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department as Assistant Director for Foreign Intelligence, later as Deputy

Director of Naval Intelligence. On June 24, 1963 he became Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) and Director of Naval Intelligence. In June, 1966, he was appointed Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D. C., and was serving in this position when he was nominated by the President on September 20, 1966 as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.

In addition to the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V," the Secretary of the Navy Commendation Medal, the Army Distinguished Unit Badge with Oak Leaf Cluster and the Navy Unit Commendation Ribbon, Admiral Taylor has received the American Defense Service Medal with star; Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with stars; American Campaign Medal; World War II Victory Medal; Navy Occupation Service Medal, Asia Clasp; National Defense Service Medal; and the Philippine Defense Ribbon with star.

Vice Admiral Taylor and his wife, Mrs. Karin Gerdts Taylor, have three children: Rufus L. Taylor, III; Carol Inga Taylor; and Lisa Noel Taylor.

* * *

NAVY
The Magazine of Sea Power
September 1966

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE TO THE NATION AND THE NAVY

Admiral Taylor, former Director of Naval Intelligence, Says an Officer With a Sound Grasp of the Field is at a Premium—He Recommends it as a Career or Sub-specialty

VICE ADMIRAL RUFUS L. TAYLOR

THE word "intelligence" — in the professional sense of information processing — comes easily to the lips in conversation and is readily enough defined. Yet — apart from the narrow sector of espionage — it is surprising how little is written on the subject as a profession.

You can major in subjects which are helpful or necessary to a career in intelligence but you cannot find adequate textbooks on the subject of intelligence itself. The student or prospective intelligence officer inevitably turns to Sherman Kent's *Strategic Intelligence*, but that pioneering work is now 16 years old.

Kent is probably more aware than anyone that he was leading his readers to a lofty peak and pointing out to them the vast unknown areas to be explored and mastered.

Covers Nearly All

With the enormous technological changes that have taken place in intelligence in the last two decades, it is probably safe to say that today one person alone will not be able to produce even an adequate *introduction* to intelligence. It would have to be a group effort and that effort itself would amount to specialized introductions to many subjects. The reason is simple. Intelligence today covers virtually every aspect of man's existence and environment—even to the outermost reaches of the universe as we know it.

It is true that once you leave the market place and enjoy the benefit of security clearances, you have access to schooling and textbooks which deal exclusively with the field of intelligence. Yet even here you receive at most only a scholastic year in intelligence studies and disciplines. Ideally—even practically—there should be much more and I dare say that in years to come the cream of the intelligence crop will have had—like medical doctors—the equivalent of a pre-intelligence major in college, followed by intelligence school and, in turn, followed by further training in specialization.

Art and Science

I have used the analogy to medicine purposely, for intelligence in our world today is both an art and a science. And when we use the word "art" in this sense we are acknowledging the omnipresent confrontation with the mysteries, quirks and paradoxes of human nature. Roughly speaking, intelligence as a science is ultimately seeking to understand an opponent's capabilities; as an art, it is seeking to understand an opponent's motivations and intentions.



The Pentagon is home for the headquarters of Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).

Because it is and always will be an art, intelligence is a siren attracting the generalist who fears the claustrophobia of narrow specialization and the specialist who desires to keep a lifeline to immediate relevance to the society that surrounds him.

You have all probably heard the simile that intelligence is an iceberg—that only the top of it is visible and the rest of it must remain concealed. The expression is trite but true. Unfortunately, this means that it must bear the natural disadvantages of the "silent service."

This means that the public hears about intelligence through inaccurate and sensational books, through special governmental releases to the press in time of crisis such as the Cuban missile situation, through court trials of security cases and through often unfounded, wide-spread rumor.

Only Failures Publicized

The average, interested citizen usually has no idea of the vast, coordinated intelligence community that works quietly and professionally on a day-to-day basis—informing, warning and estimating. That citizen cannot know that the many successes of intelligence are quietly absorbed in the sound decisions of the government every day. The many crises that abort are smothered by the few that reach birth.

More important is the fact that in a democracy such as ours, the secrecy within which intelligence must operate is often looked upon as un-American. There is the philosophy that everything known to or done by the government should be open to the public.



Admiral Forrest Sherman, shown here as a captain, moved the Office of Naval Intelligence from being a part of the Administration in Naval Operations up under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy in 1947.

Short of this, critics claim that intelligence becomes a law unto itself—a sort of inner government. This would make sense only if intelligence operated on its own—without regard to the chain of com-

Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, USN, the newly appointed deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, recently addressed the 13th annual dinner of the Naval Intelligence Reserve of the Third Naval District in New York. At the time, he was Director of Naval Intelligence. Since little is said publicly by American intelligence officials, we thought the readers of NAVY would be interested in sharing some of the Admiral's views on his favorite subject.

Admiral Taylor, shown here addressing the 13th annual dinner of the Naval Intelligence Reserve, Third Naval District, feels that a pre-intelligence major ought to be taught in college.



The author says that the "silent service" must live up to this tag name, and that "the public hears about intelligence through inaccurate and sensational books, through special government releases to the press." Here Secretary of Defense McNamara explains the Cuban missile situation to the press in a crowded room at the Pentagon.

mand in the Executive Branch and without knowledge of the President. The opposite is true—there is a chain of command in intelligence direct to the President and many checks and balances on the way.

We Pay a Price

I believe that intelligence in a system of government like ours will always suffer under this challenge to necessary secrecy. The British are even more jealous of the freedom of the citizen to be informed than we are, yet the pressures on their intelligence system are normally minimal. Perhaps this derives from centuries of close experience with European intrigues and mortal threats to the nation. Almost all other governments shield their intelligence operations almost completely from public scrutiny. Totalitarian governments like the Soviet Union make no concession on the matter.

This brings me to an observation related to intelligence in a democracy for which I will have to reach back to the House of Representatives in 1795. In an address to Congress in that year Fisher Ames stated a truth that is still valid. He said:

"A monarchy or despotism is like a full-rigged sailing ship. It moves swiftly and efficiently. It is beautiful to behold. It responds sharply to the helm. But in troubled waters, when it strikes a rock, its shell is pierced and it quickly sinks to the bottom. A republic, however, is like a raft: slow, ungainly, impossible to steer, no place from which to control events, and yet endurable and safe. It will not sink, but one's feet are always wet."

We Must Try Harder

We prefer wet feet to less freedom, but this means that our national intelligence effort will always operate under certain handicaps. For this reason, we must try harder and a good intelligence product is all the more necessary for sound governmental decisions.

Any one of you may purchase annual directories with detailed descriptions of all of our national defense contracts. The Soviets would otherwise have to have a large army of spies to ferret out such information. Instead, they can have it for a dollar or so. I doubt that we could procure such comprehensive information on the Soviet Union even with many millions of dollars to spend. Again, this is why our intelligence effort is vital and why we must be certain that our product is sound—for it becomes a keystone in national decision-making.

In the Navy we have in the postwar years felt singularly blessed by an awareness on the part of command of what intelligence can offer.

In 1947, Admiral Forrest Sherman noted that ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence) was a part of Administration in Naval Operations. He changed this promptly and placed ONI under the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy. As he phrased it, it was high time for intelligence to joint the varsity team. Today, we are a separate major division of OPNAV (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) reporting directly to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. The recognition of ONI as a varsity member is even more solid.

The Word is 'Options'

In recent years, an expression has entered our language of national strategy which was virtually unheard of in former times. The expression is "options"—sometimes also called "alternatives."

The idea of "options" has always been implicit in the decision-making process of military command, but today the word represents probably the most important single concept at the Presidential level. In brief, it is the rule today that the United States must not be enslaved by only one course of action.

The President must have real-

istic options. This approach was best described in the months following the Cuban missile crisis. One option was an invasion of Cuba. Another was to destroy the missile sites by precision bombing. Still another was a blockade or quarantine. There were many others and each was measured against economy of effort, our subsequent image in Latin America and elsewhere, the possibility of all-out nuclear warfare with the Soviet Union, and so forth.

More Questions

The conscious cultivation of the idea of options had a profound effect on the usefulness of intelligence. Intelligence has always been forbidden to generate United States policy considerations. That is sound practice. But unless the planners and policy makers ask precise questions and explain the courses of action they have in mind, intelligence can only produce a broad estimate, sound enough in generalities, but not necessarily useful for specific situations.

The planners and policy makers are today asking far more questions and intelligence is able to give far more useful and precise answers. This, of course, brings greater responsibility as intelligence is looked to by policy makers for specific support in very complex questions of what really amounts to human nature.

If you glance back at the last decade, I believe you will see easily why the present emphasis on options was missing. That was the decade of almost total preoccupation with a Soviet surprise attack on the United States. The prevailing United States response was one of massive retaliation. There was no flexibility in such a strategy. If war came it was to be total, even though triggered by a very limited confrontation of United States and Soviet forces in some remote area. That was the decade of the black or white answer.

Assessing Soviet Power

As the decade ended, people began to realize that total nuclear war would leave much of the world in ruins. They also realized that intelligence was stating that the Soviet Union was not so strong as formerly expected and that the Soviet leaders were unlikely to bring on self-destruction through willful risk.

Our government decided to let the Soviets know in a quiet, professional tone that we were not deluded by their claims of overpowering strength. The government was discreet, but specific in letting the world know of our assessment of Soviet strength.

The hard ice of rigid strategic concepts began to soften and in due time the flexibility of options permeated the scene and began to relate practically to the real problems all around us—the containment of Castro, the counterinsurgency in Viet Nam and the wave of emotional nationalism in primitive societies, such as the Congo. This major strategic change in our foreign policy was due almost entirely to sound intelligence.

Today, intelligence must more than ever be accurate and timely. It is a keystone of command and



Airview of the Central Intelligence Agency in nearby Virginia.

is essential to effective planning, programming, management and operations. In its support of national policy—better known as foreign policy—it is now far more pervasive than formerly.

To Act or Not

It must assess the consequences if we take action to solve an international problem. It must examine the varied consequences of a range of actions. It must likewise assess the consequences if we take no action. Basic to this is a thorough understanding of the motivation of a government and nation that is being studied.

Sound intelligence also assists foreign policy in another manner. Out of the welter of trouble spots throughout the world, decisions must be made as to whether the United States should take action. There are many such situations for which there is no hopeful short-range solution. Sometimes it is better simply to let them burn out. At other times, we can only ease a situation or seek an interim solution that will contain the trouble to one area.

Good intelligence can lead to a decision to help a people with food, but to virtually ignore the irresponsible actions of the government. It can point to the pitfalls of becoming overly involved in an area like the Congo, where unilateral intervention could solve nothing, but at the same time could alienate most African governments.

In essence, good intelligence assesses whether a developing situation is a strategic threat to us. It must perceive this threat even when it is a cloud on the horizon no larger than a man's hand. In a case like Viet Nam, intelligence has to face squarely the consequences of a United States withdrawal under prevailing circumstances. It cannot sugar-coat the facts, for the strategic consequences are great and obvious.

Estimates Takes His Time

On the other hand, intelligence can assess a situation in the Middle East as superficially alarming, but not likely to lead to Soviet domination. In fact, no major national policy shift is undertaken today without first asking the United States Intelligence Board to make an estimate of probable results of various courses of action. I would say that we—the principals of the Board—spend 60 to 70 per cent of our time on estimates and our weekly meetings seldom lack such an agenda item.

I have selected the various points I have discussed here to remind you that relatively little is known to the public of the vast role that intelligence plays today. Its importance to military force levels and to foreign policy is greater today than ever before. It is for this reason that intelligence must jealously guard its objectivity and never underrate the responsibility it has to provide the best support possible to those officials charged with our military and foreign policy.

In conclusion, I would like to give you my views on the outlook for naval intelligence in the next few years. As you know, we are a part of the national intelligence community which is answerable to the National Security Council. On this national level we have an independent voice on intelligence judgments as do the Central In-



OCEANOGRAPHY GETS HIGH-LEVEL LOOK

Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey meets with the leaders of the Marine Technology Society in his office, following the enactment of Public Law 89-454, which authorized a new National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering and Development. They are, left to right: Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN (Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Vice President; Dr. James R. Wakelin, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development, and Rear Admiral E. C. Stephan, USN (Ret.), former Oceanographer of the Navy and the new President of the Society.

telligence Agency, State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, Army, Air Force, National Security Agency, and, as appropriate, the FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission.

Need Top-Flight Officers

We also have an independent voice in joint intelligence judgments prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by DIA with service collaboration. And, of course, we have the mission to support the Department of the Navy and the fleet in the intelligence field. All of this adds up to a considerable responsibility and, of course, a continuing need for first-rate intelligence officers.

My personal view is that the outlook for naval intelligence is very good. The prerequisite for such an optimistic prognosis is that intelligence must be appreciated throughout the Executive branch of the Government—and that is certainly true.

There is no opportunity today for a policy maker to fly by the seat of his pants. In every echelon, the first consideration for a study project is the intelligence input and the first question asked at higher levels is whether the intelligence is sound and agreed to by the intelligence community. In short, intelligence is today a highly respected professional field that is considered vital to any contemplated course of action.

The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations are acutely aware of their need for sound intelligence support. They fully understand this complex problem and are taking action now which will strengthen naval intelligence for years to come. They are expanding the program for officer intelligence specialists—we need many more than we have had for the Navy, for DIA and the various unified commands.

The Sub-Specialists

Strong emphasis is being placed on the need for intelligence subspecialists and this is going to be of increasing significance. They have noted with concern that today there is a serious shortage of senior line officers with significant intelligence experience.

It is my personal conviction that the day is not far off when experience in intelligence will tip the scales in future selections when boards are weighing all factors in considering the potential future usefulness of officers.

The advice I would give an officer of any grade today—whether or not he is contemplating a subspecialty in intelligence—is to familiarize himself with the field of intelligence as much as possible. In future positions that he will hold, this will be a necessary asset—and he will almost certainly be at a disadvantage without it when he faces the problem of making sound policy and decisions.

In my remarks here I have tried to emphasize two main points.

The first is that the necessity for sound intelligence is now pervasive at all levels of our government. An officer who has a sound grasp of the field is at a premium.

The second is that intelligence is now a rewarding—even fascinating—career, either full-time or as a sub-specialty. It is more than ever a field for the future.



It's the Moorers' Day At CLEVELAND Launching

Champagne floods the VIP area and faces screw-up as the USS CLEVELAND (LPD 7) is sent down the ways at Ingalls Shipbuilding yard at Pascagoula, Miss. The 570-foot amphibious landing dock ship, designed to carry both landing craft and combat troops, was launched by Mrs. Thomas H. Moorer, wife of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Standing with her are, left to right, E. R. Hammett, Senior Vice President of Ingalls; Vice Admiral B. F. Roeder, then Commander Amphibious Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet; Miss Mary E. Moorer, daughter of the ship's sponsor; Admiral Moorer; Congressman Charles A. Vanik of Ohio, and Thomas R. Moorer, son of Admiral and Mrs. Moorer.

WASHINGTON STAR
SEP 20 1966

—Associated Press

President Johnson discusses "some events of the world" today with Vice Adm. Rufus L. Taylor, whom he is nominating to be deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Adm. Taylor Named to CIA

Johnson's Choice For No. 2 Spot

By ROBERT WALTERS
Star Staff Writer

Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor will be nominated by President Johnson to fill the No. 2 job at the Central Intelligence Agency.

The President today called reporters into his office to meet Taylor, a 56-year-old Navy career man who has served as deputy director of the Defense Intelligence Agency since last June.

Taylor will be nominated to be deputy director of the CIA—the post vacated June 19 when Richard Helm moved up to become head of the Intelligence agency, succeeding Admiral William Raborn.

The No. 2 job pays $28,500 a year.

When the CIA director is a civilian, as is Helms, the deputy director must be a military man, and vice versa.

Changes Under Way

If confirmed by the Senate, Taylor will move into the post at a time when the CIA is undergoing reorganization and retrenchment.

Helm's appointment three months ago was viewed as an effort to bolster morale within the CIA as well as to improve its public image, which has been blemished lately by a number of controversial disclosures—to which the agency cannot reply.

The relationship between the DIA, which Taylor is leaving, and the CIA has at times been unusually competitive because the two agencies frequently overlap in their areas of interest.

Taylor is a St. Louis native. After graduating from the Naval Academy in 1933, he saw duty with a Naval Reserve unit, with the battleship USS Arizona and then with the destroyer USS Preston.

Escaped to Australia

In September 1941, he was transferred to Naval headquarters in the Philippine Islands. After the fall of Bataan and Corregidor, he escaped to Australia by PT boat and submarine. During the remainder of the war, he served in Australia, Washington and Pearl Harbor, concentrating on communications work.

Taylor was with the first American forces to arrive in Japan after its surrender and he served there throughout 1945. After a year of duty with the office of chief of naval operations, he attended the Armed Forces Staff College and in 1947-48 was commander of the destroyer USS Noa.

From 1948 to 1953, Taylor served with the Office of Naval Intelligence. After duty in the office of the secretary of defense in 1954 and 1955, he was named assistant chief of staff for intelligence with the Pacific Fleet.

Taylor was named assistant director for foreign intelligence in 1959 and later deputy director of naval intelligence. In 1963, he became assistant chief of naval operations for intelligence and later director of naval intelligence. He joined DIA this June.